

Message Text

PAGE 01 NATO 04468 01 OF 06 221939Z

66

ACTION ACDA-10

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 ERDA-05 CIAE-00 EUR-12 H-02 INR-07

IO-10 L-03 NSAE-00 OIC-02 OMB-01 PA-01 PM-04 PRS-01

SAJ-01 SAM-01 SP-02 SS-15 TRSE-00 DODE-00 NSC-05

USIE-00 INRE-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 ACDE-00 /083 W

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O R 221815Z AUG 75

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3209

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INFO USDEL MBFR VIENNA

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S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 6 USNATO 4468/1

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO, MBFR

SUBJECT: MBFR: DEFINITION OF FORCES

REF: A) USNATO 4358 DTG 151140Z AUG 75

B) STATE 198380 DTG 202326Z AUG 75

C) MBFR DEL 405 DTG 251600Z JUL 75

1. THERE FOLLOWS THE FINAL TEXT OF THE WORKING GROUP STUDY ON FORCE DEFINITIONS THAT EMERGED FROM THE WG CONSIDERATION OF REF A ON AUGUST 21.

2. THE U.S. REP MADE THE POINT CONTAINED IN PARA 3 OF REF B THAT THE 10 PCT LIMIT ON REDUCTIONS AS OUTLINED IN CM(75)83(FINAL) NEED NOT BE INTERPRETED AS STRICTLY AS IT WAS IN PARAS 12 AND 13 OF REF A. THE UK REP (GERAHTY) POINTED OUT THAT THE 10 PCT LIMIT WAS BASED ON A JUDGEMENT BY SHAPE. HE RECOGNIZED THAT CHANGES IN THE MIX OF FORCES THROUGH REDEFINITION DISCUSSIONS
SECRET

PAGE 02 NATO 04468 01 OF 06 221939Z

MIGHT INVALIDATE THE FIGURE OF 10 PCT AND REQUIRE A DIFFERENT LIMIT ON REDUCTIONS. HOWEVER, UNTIL SHAPE COULD MAKE ANOTHER ASSESSMENT OF A DIFFERENT MIX OF FORCES, THE WG WOULD HAVE TO BE BOUND BY THE EXISTING GUIDELINES. THE OTHER WG REPS SUPPORTED

THE UK POSITION, LEAVING PARAS 12 AND 13 UNCHANGED.

3. THE UK REP BELIEVED THE WG ASSESSMENT OF THE WP PROPOSAL ON FORCE REDEFINITION SHOULD ALSO EXAMINE ITS EFFECT ON THE TABLED NATO PROPOSAL FOR A NON-INCREASE IN AIR MANPOWER BETWEEN PHASES. HE OFFERED A NEW PARAGRAPH (SEE PARA 23, BELOW) FOR CONSIDERATION.

4. THE U.S. REP ASKED IF PARA 20 OF REF A WAS INTENDED TO REVERSE THE WP PROPOSAL ON GROUND-BASED AIR DEFENSE PERSONNEL, I.E., BY SHIFTING THE FRG AND GDR PERSONNEL FROM AIR FORCES TO GROUND FORCES, WHILE RETAINING THE WP PROPOSALS ON HELICOPTER AND SSM PERSONNEL (PAR 8 OF REF C). HE SUGGESTED THE PARAGRAPH WAS UNCLEAR AND NEEDED REDRAFTING. THE NETHERLANDS REP (VAN HEEUSTRAL) SAID HE DID NOT UNDERSTAND THE FIGURES IN PARA 20 AND SUGGESTED A NEW TABLE THAT WOULD EXPLAIN HOW THE TOTALS WERE ACHIEVED.

5. THE CANADIAN REP (BARTLEMAN) ASKED IF ANYONE HAD BEEN ABLE TO DEVELOP FURTHER SUBSTANTIATION FOR THE FIGURE IN PARA 23 OF REF A OF 20,000 TO 30,000 GROUND FORCE PERSONNEL WHICH THE WP MIGHT CLAIM AS AIR FORCE PERSONNEL BECAUSE THEY SUPPORT AIR FORCES. THE IMS INTELLIGENCE DIVISION REP (JAMES) SAID HIS ANALYSTS WERE VERY SKEPTICAL OF THIS FIGURE; THEY DO NOT BELIEVE THERE ARE ANY WP GROUND FORCE PERSONNEL SUPPORTING ONLY THE AIR FORCES. THE UK REP AGREED THIS MAY BE THE CASE. HE EXPLAINED THAT THE UK INTELLIGENCE ANALYSTS OFFERED THE 20,000 TO 30,000 RANGE AS AN ESTIMATE OF THE UPPER LIMITS OF A WP CLAIM THAT NATO COULD NOT REFUTE DUE TO THE LACK OF DATA. ANY WP CLAIM OF A SLICE LARGER THAN 30,000 WOULD BE HIGH ENOUGH TO ALLOW NATO TO DEVELOP EVIDENCE TO REFUTE IT. THE WG AGREED THAT IN THIS CASE IT WOULD BE BETTER TO DROP THE NUMBER AND ADOPT THE VAGUE TERM "SUBSTANTIAL", REFERRING TO THE UK RANGE ONLY IN A FOOTNOTE

6. THE UK REP SAID PARAS 25 AND 26 OF REF A IMPLY THAT THERE WOULD BE NO MILITARY DISADVANTAGES FOR NATO IN ALLOWING THE WP TO TRANSFER GROUND FORCE PERSONNEL TO THE AIR FORCE BY REDEFINING THEIR FUNCTION; HE FELT THIS WAS PATENTLY UNTRUE. WHILE
SECRET

PAGE 03 NATO 04468 01 OF 06 221939Z

THERE MIGHT BE NEGOTIATING VALUE IN MAKING AN OFFER TO EXCLUDE CERTAIN ANOMALIES FROM THE MBFR REDUCTION BASE, ANY REDUCTION OF THE DISPARITY BETWEEN THE WP AND NATO AND THE CONSEQUENT DECREASE IN WP GROUND FORCE REDUCTIONS WOULD BE MILITARILY DISADVANTAGEOUS TO NATO. HE POINTED OUT THAT THE PURPOSE OF THE WG IS LIMITED TO ANALYZING THE MILITARY IMPLICATIONS OF THE WP PROPOSAL, NOT WEIGHING THESE AGAINST POSSIBLE NEGOTIATING ADVANTAGES.

7. THE CANADIAN REP CRITICIZES PARAS 30 AND 31 OF REF A AS REDUNDANT AND POORLY ORGANIZED. HE SAID THE "FINDINGS" OF THE STUDY SHOULD BE MADE MORE POINTED AND BE LISTED IN THE ORDER OF SIGNIFICANCE.

8. THE ACTING WG CHAIRMAN (BRANSON) CIRCULATED THIS FINAL DRAFT UNDER THE SILENCE PROCEDURE FOR CLEARANCE BY COB SETEM-
BER 4. IF ANY ALLIES REGISTER COMMENTS OR AMENDMENTS PRIOR TO
THAT DATE, THE STUDY WILL BE PLACED ON THE AGENDA FOR THE WG
SESSION OF SEPTEMBER 9. IF NOT, THE STUDY WILL GO TO THE SPC,
PROBABLY ON SEPTEMBER 8.

9. ACTION REQUESTED: REQUEST COMMENTS AND GUIDANCE ON THIS FINAL
WG STUDY ON FORCE DEFINITIONS PRIOR TO SEPTEMBER 4.

SECRET

PAGE 01 NATO 04468 02 OF 06 222010Z

66

ACTION ACDA-10

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 ERDA-05 CIAE-00 EUR-12 H-02 INR-07

IO-10 L-03 NSAE-00 OIC-02 OMB-01 PA-01 PM-04 PRS-01

SAJ-01 SAM-01 SP-02 SS-15 TRSE-00 NSC-05 USIE-00

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S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 6 USNATO 4468/2

MBFR : DEFINITION OF GROUND AND AIR FORCES

1. AT THEIR MEETING ON FRIDAY, 18 JULY, 1975, AFTER
DISCUSSING A REPORT (1) BY THE AD HOC GROUP VIENNA ON THE
COURSE OF MBFR NEGOTIATIONS DURING THE PERIOD MAY 16 TO
JULY 17, 1975, INCLUDING THE PROGRESS OF DISCUSSIONS ON A
POSSIBLE DEFINITION OF GROUND AND AIR FORCES, THE NORTH
ATLANTIC COUNCIL INVITED THE MBFR WORKING GROUP TO EXAMINE
THE MILITARY/TECHNICAL ADVANTAGES OR DISADVANTAGES TO THE
ALLIANCE OF THE WP PROPOSED DEFINITION OF FORCES AND TO
UPDATE A PREVIOUS REPORT (2) INVOLVING SIMILAR POSSIBILITIES
FOR DEFINITION OF FORCES TO BE ADDRESSED IN MBFR.

2. THIS REPORT CONSIDERS THE FOLLOWING:

A. THE DETAILS OF THE WP PROPOSED DEFINITION OF

FORCES AND THE NUMERICAL CONSEQUENCES FOR THE TOTALS OF
GROUND AND AIR FORCES ON EACH SIDE.

B. THE IMPLICATIONS OF SUCH A REDEFINITION FOR A
SECRET

PAGE 02 NATO 04468 02 OF 06 222010Z

COMBINED GROUND/AIR COMMON CEILING.

C. OTHER EFFECTS THAT THE PROPOSED DEFINITION WOULD
HAVE ON CURRENT ALLIED OBJECTIVES OR CONCERNS.

BACKGROUND

3. THE WARSAW PACT HAVE PROPOSED, IN VIENNA, A DEFINITION
OF GROUND AND AIR FORCES ON THE BASIS THAT ALL FORCES ON EACH

FOOTNOTES: (1) AGV(75)025
(2) AC/276-D(74)8

SIDE WITH A SIMILAR FUNCTION BE PLACED IN THE SAME CATEGORY,
EITHER GROUND OR AIR. THIS WOULD PROVIDE A DEFINITION OF
GROUND AND AIR FORCES BASED ON AN ENUMERATION OF FUNCTIONAL TYPES OF
FORCES. SPECIFICALLY, THE WARSAW PACT HAVE SUGGESTED THAT:

A. ALL TERRITORIAL (I.E. AREA) AIR DEFENCE PERSONNEL
WOULD BE ASSIGNED TO AIR FORCES. (BUT SEE PARA 6A. BELOW FOR THE
WP INTERPRETATION OF THIS SUGGESTION.)

B. ALL HELICOPTER PERSONNEL WOULD BE ASSIGNED TO THE GROUND
FORCES, WITH POSSIBLY SOME MINOR EXCEPTIONS. ALTERNATIVELY THEY
SUGGESTED THAT ALL HELICOPTER PERSONNEL COULD BE COUNTED AS AIR
FORCES, BUT THEY DID NOT PURSUE THIS ISSUE.

C. ALL TACTICAL SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE PERSONNEL WOULD
BE ASSIGNED TO THE GROUND FORCES.

4. IT IS FURTHER NOTED THAT THE WARSAW PACT PROPOSALS
WOULD ENTAIL INCLUSION IN AIR FORCES OF, INTER ALIA, "FORCES
OF COMBAT LOGISTICS AND SERVICES OF THE AIR FORCES AND PVO".
THERE HAS BEEN NO INDICATION IN VIENNA THAT THIS DEFINITION
MIGHT BE TAKEN, DEPENDING ON INTERPRETATION, TO NECESSITATE
THE TRANSFER OF WP LOGISTIC AND SERVICES PERSONNEL CURRENTLY
COUNTED BY NATO AS ARMY PERSONNEL, TO AIR FORCES. NEVER-
THELESS, THIS APPROACH MIGHT LATER BE EXPLOITED: AND
IS THEREFORE DISCUSSED IN PARAGRAPH 24 BELOW.

5. THE MILITARY/TECHNICAL IMPLICATIONS TO BE CONSIDERED ARE:

A. THE CHANGES IN THE NUMBERS OF REDUCTIONS OF GROUND
FORCES BY BOTH SIDES.

SECRET

PAGE 03 NATO 04468 02 OF 06 222010Z

B. THE IMPACT OF THE CHANGES ON THE COMMON CEILING
CONCEPT BEARING IN MIND THAT THE WP MAY REFUSE TO AGREE THE

ESTIMATES OF WP MANPOWER ATTRIBUTED TO THEM BY NATO AND INSIST IN THE USE IN NEGOTIATIONS OF LOWER WP MANPOWER FIGURES, AND THEIR EFFECTS ON ALLIED SECURITY. (A SEPARATE REPORT (1) DEALS WITH THE DESIRABILITY AND IMPLICATIONS OF ARRANGING CEILINGS OR SUB-CEILINGS IN A MANNER WHICH WOULD PERMIT NATO, POST-MBFR, TO TRANSFER MANPOWER BETWEEN GROUND AND AIR FORCES, IN ORDER TO RETAIN FLEXIBILITY TO RESTRUCTURE FORCES.)

C. THE IMPACT OF THE WP PROPOSALS ON THE ALLIANCE
NON-INCREASE IN AIR MANPOWER OFFER.

D. OTHER FACTORS, WHICH WOULD DERIVE FROM IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PROPOSED CHANGES, BEARING ON ALLIED CONCEPTS OF VERIFICATION, AND NON-CIRCUMVENTION, AND SECURITY.

REVIEW

6. THE WP PROPOSAL AT PARAGRAPH 3 ABOVE, ELABORATED IN SUBSEQUENT DISCUSSION IN VIENNA, WOULD INVOLVE, USING NATO AGREED DATA:

A. EXCLUSION FROM WP GROUND FORCES TO BE ADDRESSED IN MBFR OF PERSONNEL (42,000) SERVING IN CSSR AND POLISH NATIONAL AREA AIR DEFENCE ORGANISATIONS.

(1) SITCEN 2201 DTGR 221100Z AUG 75

B. INCLUSION IN WP GROUND FORCES TO BE ADDRESSED IN MBFR OF PERSONNEL SERVING IN HELICOPTER UNITS (18,000).

C. INCLUSION IN NATO GROUND FORCES (TO BE ADDRESSED IN MBFR) OF:

(I) CERTAIN PERSONNEL (2,000) OF BE, FRG, NL AND UK AIR FORCES, SERVING IN HELICOPTER UNITS.

(II) FRG PERSONNEL OF THE AIR FORCE MANNING SSM (PERSHING)(3,700 ROUNDED TO 4,000).

7. A FUNCTIONAL DEFINITION OF TERRITORIAL (I.E. AREA) AIR DEFENCE PERSONNEL (SEE PARAGRAPH 3A. ABOVE) COULD INVOLVE, IN LOGIC, THE TRANSFER FROM GROUND FORCES TO AIR FORCES OF ALL PERSONNEL ENGAGED IN AREA AIR DEFENCE OPERATIONS WHO ARE NOT
SECRET

PAGE 04 NATO 04468 02 OF 06 222010Z

UNDER THE DIRECT CONTROL OF GROUND FORCE FORMATION COMMANDERS RATHER THAN JUST CZECH AND POLISH PERSONNEL ALONE MENTIONED IN PARA 6A. UNDER THIS VERSION OF THE DEFINITION, 10,800 SOVIET PERSONNEL OPERATING SA 2/3 WEAPON SYSTEMS AND 11,500(1) NATO PERSONNEL OPERATING SIMILAR AREA AIR DEFENCE SYSTEMS WOULD ALSO HAVE TO BE TRANSFERRED FROM GROUND TO AIR FORCES. EXCLUDING THE CZECH AND POLISH PERSONNEL, THE REMAINING NUMBER OF WP PERSONNEL (10,800) IS, HOWEVER, BROADLY THE SAME AS THE NATO EQUIVALENT NUMBER (11,500), SO THE LATTER'S INCLUSION WOULD NOT AFFECT THE IMPLICATIONS, OTHER THAN NUMERICALLY, OF ADOPTING A FUNCTIONAL DEFINITION FOR MBFR PURPOSES. THESE OTHER WP AND NATO AIR DEFENC

PERSONNEL ARE NOT, THEREFORE, CONSIDERED FURTHER IN THIS PAPER.

(1) 11,500 (ROUNDED) NATO PERSONNEL DERIVED FROM US-9735 AND BE 1780.

SECRET

PAGE 01 NATO 04468 03 OF 06 222134Z

66

ACTION ACDA-10

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 ERDA-05 CIAE-00 EUR-12 H-02 INR-07

IO-10 L-03 NSAE-00 OIC-02 OMB-01 PA-01 PM-04 PRS-01

SAJ-01 SAM-01 SP-02 SS-15 TRSE-00 NSC-05 USIE-00

INRE-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 /083 W

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INFO USDEL MBFR VIENNA

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S E C R E T SECTION 3 OF 6 USNATO 4468/3

8. THESE POSSIBLE CHANGE (WITH THE EXCEPTION OF PARA
6C. (I) ABOVE) WERE DISCUSSED BY THE MBFR WORKING GROUP IN MID-1974,
ON THE BASIS OF THE DATA WHEN ACCEPTED BY NATO, UNDER CASES 1
AND 4 EXAMINED IN THE WORKING GROUP REPORT (1) OF 17 SEPTEMBER, 1974.

EFFECTS FOR AIR FORCES

9. THE NUMERICAL EFFECT OF THE CHANGES PROPOSED (PAR 6
ABOVE) BY THE WARSAW PACT FOR AIR FORCES WOULD BE 2):

TABLE UNCHANGED FROM REF A

THE DISPARITY BETWEEN THE AIR FORCE PERSONNEL STRENGTHS OF
THE TWO SIDES, ON ALLIED ASSESSMENTS, WOULD THUS BE 45,000.

10. IF, HOWEVER, ALL PACT AND NATO HELICOPTER PERSONNEL
WERE TO BE ASSIGNED TO AIR IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE ALTERNATIVE
SCENARIO REFERRED TO IN PARA 3B., RATHER THAN THAT ALL HELICOPTER
PERSONNEL SHOULD BE ASSIGNED TO GROUP FORCES AS IN THE TABLE AT

SECRET

PAGE 02 NATO 04468 03 OF 06 222134Z

PARA 9 ABOVE, NATO WOULD HAVE 18,000(3) MORE AIR (EXCLUDING SOME FRENCH BECAUSE THEIR NUMBER IS NOT KNOWN), AND THE PACT 18,000

FOOTNOTES:

(1) AC/276-D874)8

(2) IN THE FOLLOWING PARAS THE ASSESSED STRENGTH OF PACT GROUND AND AIR FORCE MANPOWER IS GIVEN FOR MID-1974 FROM MCM-86-74. ALTHOUGH THERE IS AVAILABLE IN NATO AN AGREED ASSESSMENT OF PACT GROUND AND AIR FORCE OVERALL MANPOWER TOTALS AS OF END-1974, THE FUNCTIONAL BREAKDOWN OF THOSE TOTALS IS NOT YET NATO AGREED. THEREFORE THE END-1974 TOTALS ON PACT FORCES ARE NOT USED IN THIS PAPER. FOR NATO THE LATEST END-1974 FIGURES ARE USED FROM AC/276(MBFR DATA)-WP(75)4.

(3) BREAKDOWN BY COUNTRIES - BE-430, CA-100, FRG-9,700, NL-430, UK-910, US-6,570 - TOTAL 18,000 (ROUNDED)

MORE. THUS, NATO WOULD HAVE 205,000 AIR AND THE PACT 250,000 AIR. THE DISPARITY WOULD THEN BE 45,000, RATHER THAN 15,000 CURRENTLY ASSESSED. ONE ALLIED ARGUMENT FOR NOT ADDRESSING AIR FORCES IN MBFR FOR REDUCTIONS - THAT THEY ARE BROADLY EQUAL IN NUMBERS - WOULD BE ERODED UNDER EITHER ALTERNATIVE.

EFFECTS FOR GROUND FORCES

11. FOR GROUND FORCES MANPOWER, THE NUMERICAL EFFECT OF THE CHANGES PROPOSED BY THE WARSAW PACT WOULD BE(1):

TABLE UNCHANGED FROM REF A

12. IF ALL PACT AND NATO HELICOPTER PERSONNEL, IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE ALTERNATIVE PROPOSAL MENTIONED IN PARA 3A. ABOVE, WERE TO BE ASSIGNED TO AIR, NATO WOULD HAVE 19,000 LESS GROUND (EXCLUDING SOME FRENCH BECAUSE THEIR NUMBER IS NOT KNOWN) AND THE PACT 18,000. THUS NATO WOULD HAVE 778,000 GROUND AND THE PACT 895,000 GROUND PERSONNEL. THE DISPARITY WOULD THEN BE 117,000

13. THE NET EFFECT OF THE 20 PROPOSALS WOULD BE TO INCREASE THE ALLIED GROUND MANPOWER COUNT BY 6,000 AND TO REDUCE THE WP GROUND MANPOWER COUNT BY 24,000; THEREBY REDUCING THE DISPARITY
SECRET

PAGE 03 NATO 04468 03 OF 06 222134Z

BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES BY 30,000. IT WILL BE NOTED (PARA 11 ABOVE) THAT THE DISPARITIES REDUCE THUS:

(1) SEE FOOTNOTE (2) ON PARA 9

TABLE UNCHANGED FROM REF A

14. IF, AS PRESCRIBED IN C-M873)83(FINAL), ALLIED REDUCTIONS IN GROUND FORCES DO NOT EXCEED 10 PCT , THE INCREASE IN ALLIED REDUCTIONS CONSEQUENT ON THIS REDEFINITION WOULD NOT BE SUSTANTIAL: APPROXIMATELY 600 (10PCT OF THE 6,000 MEN ADDED TO THE ALLIED MANPOWER STRENGTH). ALLIED REQUIREMENT FOR A COMMON CEILING COULD NOT BE SET BELOW 717,000 FOR GROUND MANPOWER, (I.E. BASED ON A MAXIMUM 10PCT REDUCTION FROM END-74 ALLIED GROUND MANPOWER STRENGTH OF 797,000).

15. FOR THE WARSAW PACT, THE NUMBER OF GROUND FORCE REDUCTIONS REQUIRED WOULD REDUCE ON TWO COUNTS:
A. BY A NET 24,000, ASSIGNED TO AIR FORCES.
B. BY A FURTHER 17,000, AS A RESULT OF RAISING OF THE COMMON CIELING OBJECTIVE FROM 700,000 TO 717,000.
(THE REDUCTIONS REQUIRED OF THE WARSAW PACT WOULD THUS BE:
(913,000 - 717,000) EQUAL 196,000)

16 IF THE COMMON CEILING IN GROUND MANPOWER WAS SET AT 717,000 THE WARSAW PACT WOULD REDUCE GROUND MANPOWER, AS COMPARED WITH NATO, ON A RATIO OF APPROXIMATELY 2.5:-. HOWEVER, THE REDEFINITION OF WARSAW PACT GROUND FORCES WOULD MEAN THAT THE NUMBER OF REDUCTIONS TO BE MADE BY THE PACT TO REACH A COMMON CEILING WOULD BE REDUCED BY 41,000. THIS COULD DECREASE SIGNIFICANTLY THE IMPACT OF MANPOWER REDUCTIONS ON THE MAIN WP GROUND COMBAT ELEMENTS, AND DIMINISH, POSSIBLY IN THE ORDER OF THE EQUIVALENT OF 3 OR 4 DIVISIONS, THE EXTENT TO WHICH THE REDUCTIONS WOULD ADVERSELY AFFECT WP COMBAT CAPABILITY IN THE NGA.

17. NUMERICAL ASSESSMENTS OF THE EFFECTS OF REDEFINITION ARE CRITICALLY DEPENDENT ON THE ACCURACY OF ALLIED ESTIMATES OF WARSAW PACT MANPOWER. IN THAT RESPECT, ALTHOUGH THE NATO INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY HAS NOT MADE ANY ESTIMATE OF A POSSIBLE
SECRET

PAGE 04 NATO 04468 03 OF 06 222134Z

MARGIN OF ERROR, THE MBFR WORKING GROUP HAS A WORKING HYPOTHESIS THAT IT COULD BE AS HIGH AS 10PCT. THE EFFECTS OF MARGINS OF ERROR AT 10PCT AND 5PCT ARE ILLUSTRATED BELOW: BASED ON ALLIED ESTIMATES AS AT MID-1974.

TABLE - UNCHANGED FROM REF A

18. THE EFFECTS OF MARGINS OF ERROR AT 10PCT AND 5PCT ON THE ASSESSED DISPARITY BETWEEN THE REDEFINED GROUND FORCES MANPOWER WOULD BE:

TABLE - UNCHANGED FROM REF A

SECRET

PAGE 01 NATO 04468 04 OF 06 222137Z

66

ACTION ACDA-10

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 ERDA-05 CIAE-00 EUR-12 H-02 INR-07

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S E C R E T SECTION 4 OF 6 USNATO 4468

19. ASSUMING ALLIED OBJECTIVES FOR PHASE I WERE IMPLEMENTED
(ONCLUDING WITHDRAWAL OF 29,000 US SOLIDERS AND 68,000 USSR SOLDIERS)
REDUCTIONS REQUIRED TO REACH A COMMON CEILING IN PHASE II AT
717,000 WOULD BE, USING THE MID-1974 ALLIED ESTIMATE OF PACT
STRENGTH:

TABLE-UNCHANGED FROM REF A

IMPLCATIONS OF REDEFINITION FOR A COMBINED GROUND/AIR COMMON CEILING

20. A COMBINED GROUND/AIR COMMON CEILING, ADOPTED ON THE BASIS
OF THE PROPOSED DEFINITION OF FORCES, COULD BE CALCULATED BY ADDING
187,000(REDEFINED ALLIED AIR FORCE MANPOWER) TO 717,000(MINIUMUM
ALLIED GROUND MANPOWER AT 10 PERCENT REDUCTION), I.E. 904,000,
I.E. ABOUT 900,000.

21. ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT AIR FORCES WILL NOT BE ADDRESSED
FOR REDUCTIONS, THE NUMBERS OF GROUND PERSONNEL REDUCTIONS BY THE
SECRET

PAGE 02 NATO 04468 04 OF 06 222137Z

WP TO REACH A COMBINED COMMON CILING OF ABOUT 900,000 ACCEPTABLE TO
NATO WOULD NOT BE AFFECTED BY REDEFINITION. IN FACT, THE PACT WOULD
HAVE TO REDUCE BY 248,000. HOWEVER, THOSE WP REDUCTIONS WULD BE
TAKEN FROM GROUND FORCES REDUCED BY REDEFINITION, THAT IS 913,000
(SEE PARA 11). TO ACHIEVE A COMBINED GROUND/AIR COMMON CEILING,
BEUCASE THE WP AIR MANPOWER AS REDEFINED (232,000) IS HIGHER THAN
NATO'S (QIUNPPPLN THE WP RESIDUAL GROUND FORCES (668,000)

WOULD HAVE TO VALL BELOW THE RESIDUAL NATO GROUND FORCE
MANPOWER (717,000), BROADOLY TO THE EXTENT OF THE DISPARITY (45,000)
BETWEEN ALLIED AND PACT AIR FORCE MANPOWER COUNTS. THUS THERE COULD
BE NO COMMON GROUND FORCE SUB-CEILING UNLESS THE OVERALL AIR/
GROUND MANPOWER COMMON CEILING WAS SET AT ABOUT 950,000.

22. THE WORKING GROUP TOOK INTO CONSIDERATION THAT THE
ANOMALIES REDRESSED IN THE WP PROPOSAL MIGH SIMILARLY BE
REDUESSED BY COUNTING AS GROUND FORCES, FOR BOTH SIDES, ALL AREA AIR
DEFENCE PERSONNEL, WHETHER ARMY OR AIR FORCE, WHO MAN OR SUPPORT
GROUND-TO-AIR SYSTEMS (CASE 3 CONSIDERED IN AC/276-D(74)8). THIS
WOULD ADD ABOUT 29,000 NATO AIRMEN TO NATO GROUND FORCES TO BE
ADDRESSED IN REDUCTIONS, AND ABOUT 11,000 WP (GDR) AIRMEN TO THE WP
GROUND FORCES. UNDER THAT ARRANGEMENT, TO ACHIEVE A COMBINED
GROUND/AIR COMMON CILIHING SET AT 900,000, THE WP REDUCTIONS WOULD
REMAIN, ON ALLIED MANPOWER ESTIMATES, AT 245,000. IF THERE WERE
NO AIR REDUCTIONS BY EITHER SIDE THE RESIDUAL GROUND MANPOWER FOR THE
WP WOULD BE 703,000 FOR NATO, THE RESIDUAL GROUND MANPOWER WOULD
BE 736,000 AS FOLLOWS (FOOTNOTE(2) PARA 9 APPLIES):

	NATO	WP
AIR STRENGTH	193,000	208,000
GROUND STRENGTH	791,000	937,000
	934,000	1,145,000

COMBINED G/A COMMON CEILING	900,000	900,000
TO BE REDUCED	84,000	245,000

GROUND STRENGTH	791,000	937,000
ADD G/A SYSTEM PERSONNEL	29,000	11,000
	820,000	948,000

RECUTION FROM GRD ONLY	84,000	245,000
	736,000	703,000

SECRET

PAGE 03 NATO 04468 04 OF 06 222137Z

IMPACT OF THE WP RPOPOSAL ON THE ALLIANCE NON-INCREASE IN
AIR MANPOWER OFFER

23. THE ALLIANCE HAS EXPRESSED WILLINGNESS TO NEGOTIATE A
PROPOSAL FOR A NON-INCREASE IN AIR MANPOWER BETWEEN THE TWO PHASES
OF MBFR. IF THE WP PROPOSAL FOR REDEFINITION OF FORCES WERE
ACCEPTED BY NATO IT WOULD MEAN THAT NATO'S AIR FORCES WOULD BE
CONTRACTUALISED AT 187,000 FOR THIS PERIOD AS COMPARED WIHT A WP
TOTAL (USING NATO DATA) OF 232,000, A DISPARITY OF 45,000 MEN (SEE
PARA 9 ABOVE). THE RESULTANT (AND DISADVANTAGEOUS FOR NATO) EFFECT
OF THIS OFFER ON THE SCALE OF WP GROUND FORCE MANPOWER
REDUCTIONS IN PHASE II WOULD BE AS SET OUT IN PARA 16 (ABOVE.)

OTHER EFFECTS OF THE WP PROPOSAL

24. THE CSSR AND POLISH AREA AIR DEFENCE TROOPS, WHO WOULD

BE TRANSFERRED TO THE AIR FORCE COUNT UNDER THE WP PROPOSAL,

CONTRIBUTE DIRECTLY TO THE SECURITY OF SOVIET AND OTHER PACT FORCES MOVING FORWARD FROM THE REAR TO THE WEST IN TIMES OF WAR. THEY ALSO WOULD PROTECT AIRFIELDS AND THE WP LINE OF COMMUNICATION WITH THE USSR WHICH NATO IN TIMES OF WAR MIGHT WANT TO ATTACK FROM THE AIR. HOWEVER, THEY DO NOT CONTRIBUTE DIRECTLY TO THE GROUND FORCE CONFRONTATION, AND IN PARTICULAR, DO NOT CONTRIBUTE TO THE MOBILE, ARMORED (TANK) THREAT WHICH THE ALLIES MOST WISH TO REDUCE. THE TRANSFER OF THESE ELEMENTS TO THE AIR FORCE COUNT WOULD NOT WRODE THE ALLIED CONCEPT OF REDUCING THE CONFRONTATION. CONVERSELY, THE HELICOPTERS AND THEIR OPERATING AND SUPPORT PERSONNEL WHO WOULD

BE INCLUDED IN THE WP GROUND FORCES COUNT DO, IN PART, CONTRIBUTE TO THE COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS OF WP GROUND COMBAT FORMATIONS: IF THE WP DEFINITION WERE ACCEPTED, THESE HELICOPTER PERSONNEL WOULD BE INCLUDED IN THE GROUND FORCES TO BE ADDRESSED IN MBFR. AT PRESENT THE ALLIES COUNT THEM AS AIR FORCE PERSONNEL. ON THE FACE OF IT, THE CHANGES IN DEFINITION PROPOSED BY THE WARSAW PACT SHOULD HAVE NO ADVERSE MILITARY IMPLICATIONS, IN THEMSELVES, FOR NATO. HOWEVER, AS INDICATED ABOVE (PARA 16), THE LOWER SCALE OF REDUCTIONS REQUIRED OF THE WP COULD BE MORE EASILY ABSORBED AND COULD DIMINISH, POSSIBLY IN THE ORDER OF THE EQUIVALENT OF 3 OR 4 DIVISIONS, THE EXTENT TO WHICH PHASE II REDUCTIONS WOULD ADVERSELY AFFECT
SECRET

PAGE 04 NATO 04468 04 OF 06 222137Z

WP COMBAT CAPABILITY IN THE NGA.

25. THE POINT IS MADE (PARA 4 ABOVE) THAT THE WP DEFINITION COULD BE INTERPRETED IN SUCH A WAY THAT THE WP, AND THE USSR IN PARTICULAR, COULD CLAIM THAT A GREATER SLICE OF THE INTEGRATED REAR FORCES OF COMBAT LOGISTICS AND SERVICES SHOULD BE ASSIGNED TO THE AIR FORCES. THAT SLICE OF COURSE WOULD BE OVER AND ABOVE THE COMBAT LOGISTIC AND SERVICE PERSONNEL OF THE PACT AIR FORCES ALREADY COUNTED BY NATO AS AIR (23 PERCENT OF THE TOTAL PACT AIR STRENGTH). IT WOULD INVOLVE OTHER PACT PERSONNEL, PRESENTLY COUNTED BY NATO AS GROUND SUPPORTING BOTH THE PACT ARMY AND AIR FORCE. THERE IS NO AVAILABLE INTELLIGENCE TO INDICATE HOW MANY MEN THE WP

SECRET

PAGE 01 NATO 04468 05 OF 06 222107Z

60

ACTION ACDA-10

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 ERDA-05 CIAE-00 EUR-12 H-02 INR-07

IO-10 L-03 NSAE-00 OIC-02 OMB-01 PA-01 PM-04 PRS-01

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USNMR SHAPE
USCINCEUR

S E C R E T SECTION 5 OF 6 USNATO 4468

MIGHT CLAIM AS FALLING UNDER THIS DEADING. TAKING ACCOUNT OF THE LOW MANPOWER TO AIRCRAFT RATION IN THE PACT, AND ESPECIALLY IN THE SOVIET AIR FORCES, THE WORKING GROUP THINK IT POSSIBLE THAT THE WP MIGHT CLAIM A SUBSTANTIAL NUMBER(1) OF PERSONNEL, PRESENTLY COUNTED BY NATO IN GROUND FORCES TOTAL. IT IS TRUE THAT ON THE NATO SIDE SOME GROUND FORCE PERSONNEL COULD BE RE-CATEGORISED AS AIR BECAUSE THEY PROVIDE LOGISTIC SUPPORT TO THE NATO AIR FORCES. HOWEVER, THE NATO NUMBER INVOLVED WOULD BE MUCH SMALLER THAN THE NUMBER WHICH THE WP MIGHT CLAIM TO BE APPLICABLE TO WP FORCES.

26. THERE IS, AS SAID IN PARA 4, NO INDICATION THAT THE WP INTEND TO EXPLOIT THIS LOOPHOLE. THE MBFR WORKING GROUP NEVERTHELESS BELIEVES THAT IT COULD BE EXPLOITED AND THAT THIS PROBABLY WOULD ONLY BECOME CLEAR WHEN THE WARSAW PACT TABLES ITS AIR MANPOWER FIGURES ON FORCES OF COMBAT LOGISTIC AND SERVICES FOR THE AIR FORCE, INCLUDING PVOS. THEREFORE, IT WOULD BE IMPORTANT TO EXCLUDE THIS POSSIBILITY, WHICH IF USED WOULD
SECRET

PAGE 02 NATO 04468 05 OF 06 222107Z

FURTHER REDUCE THE MANPOWER DISPARITY BETWEEN ALLIED AND PACT GROUND MANPOWER: AND SIMILARLY FURTHER REDUCE THE NUMBER OF GROUND MANPOWER REDUCTIONS REQUIRED BY THE PACT UNDER A COLLECTIVE GROUND COMMON CEILING.

(1) NATO HAS NOT INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE ON WHICH TO REFUTE ANY SUCH CLAIM. SOME NATIONS FEEL THAT THE NUMBER THE WP MIGHT CLAIM COULD BE IN THE ORDER OF 20,000-30,000 MEN, OR EVEN HIGHER.

27. THE MBFR WORKING GROUP BELIEVE THAT THE PRESENT ALLIED APPROACH TO THE DEFINITION OF FORCES REMAINS ON MILITARY/ TECHNICAL GROUNDS THE MOST ADVANTAGEOUS WAY FOR NATO TO DEFINE FORCES ON BOTH SIDES. IT IS COMPREHENSIVE, THE EASIEST TO VERIFY, IT EXCLUDES RESERVISTS, PARA-MILITARY PERSONNEL AND CIVILIANS, AND IT PLAYS DOWN THE EQUIPMENT ISSUE.

28. APART FROM ITS NUMERICAL EFFECT, THE FUNCTIONAL APPROACH (SEE PARA 7) COULD BE EXPLOITED BY THE WP IN THEIR CONTINUING PRESSURE TO ADDRESS ARMAMENTS FOR REDUCTIONS. ADOPTION OF THE WP REDEFINITION PROPOSAL WOULD AOS ERODE THE ALLIED ARGUMENT THAT AIR FORCE PERSONNEL SHOULD NOT BE ADDRESSED FOR REDUCTION BECAUSE NUMBERS ON BOTH SIDES ARE APPROXIMATELY EQUAL. ADDITIONALLY, IN THE ABSENCE OF AN EXCHANGE OF DATA THE OUTCOME OF AN UNUMER- ATION OF FORCES BY FUNCTION IS UNPREDICTABLE (SEE PARA 25).

29. IT FOLLOWS FROM THE PRECEDING PARAGRAPHS THAT, BY APPLYING THE WP DEFINITION PROPOSALS, THE WP GROUND MANPOWER DISPARITY AS CURRENTLY ASSESSED BY NATO WOULD BE REDUCED BY 30,000; (SEE PARA 13) A REDUCTION WHICH THE WP COULD MORE EASILY ASSIMILATE AND WHICH WOULD ABATE THE MAGNITUDE OF REDUCTIONS IN WP COMBAT CAPABILITY WHICH NATO IS SEEKING. EXCEPTIONS TO THE NATO DEFINITION APPROACH, TO RECOGNISE THE SPECIFIC ANOMALOUS ELEMENTS IDENT- IFIED IN THE WP PROPOSALS (AS AT PARA 6 ABOVE) AND TO TRANSFER PERSONNEL BETWEEN GROUND AND AIR AS APPROPRIATE WOULD SIMILARLY, IN TOTAL, DIMINISH THE GROUND MANPOWER REDUCTIONS REQUIRED OF THE WP UNDER THE EXISTING ALLIED APPROACH. THE CHANGE IN SCALE OF REDUCTIONS WOULD REDUCE ALLIED PROSPECTS OF ACHIEVING MAXIMUM REDUCTIONS OF WP COMBAT CAPABILITY IN THE NGA.

VERIFICATION

SECRET

PAGE 03 NATO 04468 05 OF 06 222107Z

30. THE VERIFICATION EFFECTS OF A REDEFINITION OF FORCES ON A BASIS SIMILAR TO THAT UNDER DISCUSSION WERE EXAMINED BY THE WORKING GROUP IN MID-1974(1). THE FINDINGS OF THAT STUDY REMAIN VALID. AS INDICATED, THE WORKING GROUP FORESEE SUBSTANTIAL DIF- FICULTY IN VERIFYING RESIDUAL FORCE LEVELS OF MANPOWER ESPECIALLY IF ONLY NATIONAL MEANS WERE TO BE USED. THE TASK WOULD BE FURTHER COMPLICATED BY A NEED TO IDENTIFY PERSONNEL WEARING THE SAME UNIFORM BUT PERFORMING FUNCTIONS WHICH WOULD CATEGORISE THEM AS BELONGING TO THE OTHER SERVICE.

NON-CIRCUMVENTION

31. THE RECATEGORISATION OF CZECH AND POLISH AREA AIR FEENCE PERSONNEL FROM GROUND TO AIR WOULD, AS COMPARED WITH THE EXISTING NATO CONCEPT(2) PROVIDE NO ADDITIONAL OPENING FOR CIRCUMVENTION PROVIDED THAT THOSE FORCES ARE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN SOME FORCE LIMITATION OR OTHER FORMULATION. THE RECATEGORISATION OF WP HELICOPTER PERSONNEL FROM AIR TO GROUND WOULD PROVIDE NO OPENING FOR CIRCUMVENTION OF AN MBFR AGREEMENT.

(1) AC/276-D(74)8

(2) C-M(73)83(FINAL)

FINDINGS

32. THE MBFR WORKING GROUP FIND THAT REDEFINITION OF FORCES ON THE LINES OF THE WP PROPOSALS WOULD IMPACT ON ALLIED SECURITY IN THE FOLLOWING WAYS:

A. REDUCE THE NUMBER OF WP GROUND FORCES ADDRESSED FOR REDUCTIONS BY 24,000 ON THE BASIS OF THE ADJUSTMENT OF THE SPECIFIC ELEMENTS ALREADY PROPOSED BY THE WP (TERRITORIAL AIR DEFENCE, HELICOPTERS AND TACTICAL SSM) AND REDUCE THE ASSESSED DISPARITY BETWEEN THE GROUND MANPOWER STRENGTHS OF THE TWO SIDES.
(PARAS 3,12, 13 AND 15)

B. PROVIDE AN OPENING FOR THE WP TO CLAIM THAT A SIGNIFICANT ADDITIONAL NUMBER OF WP PERSONNEL, COUNTED BY NATO AS GROUND, SHOULD BE ASSIGNED FUNCTIONALLY TO AIR; THUS FURTHER
SECRET

PAGE 04 NATO 04468 05 OF 06 222107Z

REDUCING THE WP GROUND PERSONNEL TO BE ADDRESSED IN MBFR AND FURTHER REDUCE THE ASSESSED DISPARITY BETWEEN NATO AND WP GROUND FORCES. (PARA 25)

33. THE WORKING GROUP FURTHER FIND THAT:

A. IT WOULD STILL BE TECHNICALLY PRACTICABLE, WITH FORCES REDEFINED AS PROPOSED BY THE WP, TO REACH A COMMON COLLECTIVE CEILING FOR GROUND FORCES (AT ABOUT 717,000 RESTRICTING THE ALLIED REDUCTIONS TO 10 PCT) INVOLVING ASYMMETRIC GROUND FORCE REDUCTIONS IN THE RATIO OF 2.5:1 (WP:NATO), PROVIDED AIR FORCES WERE NOT INCLUDED IN ANY OVERALL AIR/GROUND COMMON CEILING. HOWEVER, THE WP WOULD BE

SECRET

PAGE 01 NATO 04468 06 OF 06 222130Z

66

ACTION ACDA-10

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 ERDA-05 CIAE-00 EUR-12 H-02 INR-07

IO-10 L-03 NSAE-00 OIC-02 OMB-01 PA-01 PM-04 PRS-01

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S E C R E T SECTION 6 OF 6 USNATO 4468

REQUIRED TO REDUCE SUBSTANTIALLY LESS MANPOWER (AT LEAST 41,000 LESS) THAN ENVISAGED IN CURRENT ALLIED PROPOSALS, WHICH WOULD DIMINISH THE IMPACT OF REDUCTIONS ON WP COMBAT CAPABILITY IN THE MGA, POSSIBLY BY AS MUCH AS THE EQUIVALENT OF 3 OR 4 COMBAT DIVISIONS. (PARAS 14-16)

B. IN THE ABSENCE OF AN EXCHANGE OF DATA IT IS NOT POSSIBLE TO CALCULATE PRECISELY THE NUMERICAL EFFECTS OF THE WP DEFINITION PROPOSALS: ASSESSMENTS OF THE EFFECTS OF THESE PROPOSALS ARE ESSENTIALLY DEPENDENT ON THE VALIDITY OF ALLIED ESTIMATES OF WP MANPOWER. MEANWHILE, THE MILITARY SECURITY ASPECTS OF THE REDEFINITION PROPOSAL CAN ONLY BE ASSESSED WITHIN THE MARGIN OF ERROR ASSESSMENT OF MANPOWER TOTALS ASSUMED BY THE WORKING GROUP (UP TO 10 PCT) (PARA 17)

C. IT WOULD BE GREATLY PREFERABLE, MILITARILY, TO MAINTAIN IN PRINCIPLE THE PRESENT ALLIED APPROACH TO DEFINITION OF FORCES. (PARA 27)
SECRET

PAGE 02 NATO 04468 06 OF 06 222130Z

D. BY CREATING A SUBSTANTIAL DISPARITY BETWEEN THE NATO MANPOWER COUNTS OF NATO AND WP AIR FORCES, ON ALLIED ARGUMENT FOR NOT ADDRESSING AIR FORCES IN MBFR WOULD BE ERODED. (PARAS 9 AND 10)

E. REDEFINITION ON THE WP BASIS WOULD REQUIRE EITHER AN OVERALL AIR/GROUND COMMON CEILING OF 900,000 WITH NO NUMERIC GROUND FORCE COMMON SUB-CEILING OR A NUMERIC GROUND FORCE COMMON SUB-CEILING OF ABOUT 717,000 AND AN OVERALL AIR/GROUND COMMON CEILING OF ABOUT 950,000. (PARAS 21-23)

F. REDEFINITION ON THE WP BASIS WOULD RESULT IN THE CURRENT ALLIANCE OFFER FOR A NON-INCREASE IN AIR MANPOWER BETWEEN PHASES CONTRACTUALISING A DISPARITY OF 45,000 IN FAVOUR OF THE WP BETWEEN THE TOTAL AIR FORCE STRENGTHS OF THE TWO SIDES. (PARA 9)

G. THE TASK OF VERIFICATION OF RESIDUAL FORCE LEVELS WOULD BE MORE COMPLICATED THAN IS THE CASE UNDER PRESENT ALLIED APPROACH TO DEFINITION OF FORCES. IN NEITHER CASE, HOWEVER, COULD VERIFICATION OF RESIDUAL MANPOWER LEVELS BE GUARANTEED WITH ANY CONFIDENCE. (PARA 30)
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